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Abstract 
 
Recent uprisings in the Arab world consist of individuals revealing vastly different preferences 
than were expressed prior to the uprisings. This paper sheds light on the general mechanisms 
underlying large-scale social and institutional change. We employ an agent-based model to test 
the impact of authority centralization and social network technology on preference revelation and 
falsification, social protest, and institutional change. We find that the amount of social and 
institutional change is decreasing with authority centralization in simulations with low network 
range but is increasing with authority centralization in simulations with greater network range. 
The relationship between institutional change and social shocks is not linear, but rather is 
characterized by sharp discontinuities. The threshold at which a shock can “tip” a system 
towards institutional change is decreasing with the geographic reach of citizen social networks. 
Farther reaching social networks reduce the robustness and resilience of central authorities to 
change. This helps explain why highly centralized regimes frequently attempt to restrict 
information flows via the media and Internet. More generally, our results highlight the role that 
information and communication technology can play in triggering cascades of preference 
revelation and revolutionary activity in varying institutional regimes.  
 
JEL Codes:  C63, Z13, D83, D85, D71, H11  
Keywords: preference falsification, revolution, protest, network technology, agent-based model 
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Introduction 
Recent uprisings in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and other parts of the Arab world have come quite 
unexpectedly to most observers. Although the seeds of discontent had been sown for decades in 
these countries, public anti-government displays barely existed. Such rapid changes in publicly 
displayed preferences are not a new phenomenon; precedents include the fall of Communism in 
the Eastern bloc, the end of apartheid in South Africa, and the civil rights movement (Kuran 
1989; Kuran 1991a; Kuran 1991b; Lohmann 1994; Kuran 1995a; Kuran 1995b; Wright 1999).1  
We argue that economies containing two features – highly centralized power and 
widespread information and communication technology (ICT) – are conducive to massive and 
rapid preference revelation. We define power centralization as the ability of one actor to impose 
multiple sanctions on individuals. Examples include national and localized sanctions in 
autocracies, economic and religious sanctions in theocracies (such as Iran), or political and legal 
sanctions against dissidents (as in Burma).2 The ability of central authorities to impose sanctions 
on individuals, coupled with heterogeneous citizens whose true preferences are hidden, can 
calcify a society – leaving it stuck at sub-optimal equilibria despite changes to individual 
preferences. These sub-optimal equilibria can be escaped in a cascade of sudden preference 
                                                 
1 For more on the mechanisms underlying rapid changes in publicly displayed preferences, see (Granovetter 1978; 
Schelling 1978; Oliver, Marwell et al. 1985; Macy 1991; Banerjee 1992; Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer et al. 1992; 
Young 1993; Lohmann 1994; Centola, Willer et al. 2005; Bicchieri 2006; Siegel 2009; Willer, Kuwabara et al. 
2009; Ellis and Fender 2011; Rubin 2011). 
2 Goldstone (2011), in an article on the Arab Spring, notes that “Sultanistic governments” are particularly 
susceptible to revolutions. His definition of Sultanistic is very similar to our definition of centralization (italics 
ours): “Such governments arise when a national leader expands his personal power at the expense of formal 
institutions. Sultanistic dictators appeal to no ideology and have no purpose other than maintaining their personal 
authority. They may preserve some of the formal aspects of democracy--elections, political parties, a national 
assembly, or a constitution--but they rule above them by installing compliant supporters in key positions … Behind 
the scenes, such dictators generally amass great wealth, which they use to buy the loyalty of supporters and punish 
opponents. … The new sultans control their countries' military elites by keeping them divided. Typically, the 
security forces are separated into several commands (army, air force, police, intelligence)--each of which reports 
directly to the leader. The leader monopolizes contact between the commands, between the military and civilians, 
and with foreign governments, a practice that makes sultans essential for both coordinating the security forces and 
channeling foreign aid and investment.“ 
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revelation initiated by a shock which encourages some individuals to publicly reveal their 
preferences, which in turn alters norms and triggers a cascade. 
Centralization can encourage individuals to publicly lie about their privately-held 
preferences because those who transgress centralized authorities incur sanctions over numerous 
dimensions. For example, if one breaks religious dictates in Iran, they may suffer consequences 
in the afterlife as well as economic consequences in the present. Such societies are prone to 
cascades of preference revelation if preferences are inter-connected; that is, if individuals derive 
utility from conforming to the actions of others (Granovetter 1978; Kuran 1995). A cascade can 
occur after a shock encourages some to reveal their privately-held preferences, which encourages 
others to do so, and so on. We argue that ICT facilitates this process; in order for the cascade 
mechanism to occur, people have to know how others are acting. Indeed, we find that cascades 
of revolutionary activity are more likely to occur in centralized regimes, but only when networks 
are large. In small network societies, shocks are less likely to trigger a cascade when power is 
highly centralized. Further, the thresholds at which systems tip towards institutional change are 
reduced by increasing the range over which agents can add to their social networks. This helps 
explain why highly centralized regimes (e.g., Libya, China, Burma, North Korea) frequently 
attempt to restrict information flows; when their citizens are weakly connected, the probability of 
a revolutionary cascade arising decreases. 
The popular notion that innovations in ICT are helping to facilitate the social and 
institutional changes we are witnessing in real time (Shirky 2011) is not without its detractors 
(Morozov 2011). Whether or not these technologies are party to the initiation of revolutions, 
what is less understood is the capacity for these innovations, such as Facebook and Twitter, to 
build upon social change - both helping to propagate a cascade of preference revelation and 
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support the public protest that emerges from it and facilitating its translation into institutional 
change. We argue that widespread ICT supports efforts to challenge authority by encouraging the 
public revelation of preferences. We model such actions in an agent-based framework to provide 
a better understanding of the mechanisms connecting political institutions, ICT, and revolutions. 
 
Revolution and the Agent-Based Framework 
The basic model linking institutional centralization and rapid, revolutionary change was 
proposed in Rubin (2011). It consists of heterogeneous agents who face costs when their actions 
differ from i) their internal preferences (or “bliss points”), ii) an endogenous social norm, iii) a 
“central authority”, and iv) a “non-central” authority. Both authorities face costs from diverging 
from the citizenry, and the central authority can impose a cost on the non-central authority. The 
degree of centralization is increasing in the latter cost. We model centralization in this manner to 
highlight the idea that centralized power works through institutional conduits. For example, the 
religious hierarchy in Iran has power to impose political sanctions because the leading political 
authorities face significant costs from disobeying their dictates. Likewise, most autocrats (such 
as in pre-revolution Egypt) impose multifarious sanctions through the military. In such a regime, 
the military is the “non-central” authority and the autocrat’s degree of centralization hinges on 
how costly military authorities view choosing actions which defy the autocrat. 
The model suggests that citizens falsify their preferences in favor of the central authority 
(i.e., make public expressions different from their internal preferences) when centralization is 
greater since they face multiple costs from transgression. Preference falsification can unravel, 
however, when a widespread shock alters the costs citizens face. If the shock is large enough, 
some citizens reveal their preferences, which alters the social norm, which itself encourages 
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more citizens to reveal their preferences. A cascade can result, entailing a vastly different 
equilibrium of public expression. We refer to the difference between the actions of citizens and 
authorities as “protest” and the change in the pre-shock and post-shock actions of authorities as 
“institutional revolution”.  
A cascade of preference revelation is dependent on the means of social transmission. 
Social norms change only as people are made aware that the modal behavior in their social 
network is changing.  Network structure has been shown to be relevant to the way in which 
behavior spreads through populations in game theoretic proofs (Allen and Gale 2000; Lee and 
Valentinyi 2000; Morris 2000), network theory (Golub and Jackson 2011),  computational 
simulations (Bonabeau 2002; Epstein 2002; Cowan and Jonard 2004; Delre, Jager et al. 2007), 
and social experiments (Centola 2010; Fowler and Christakis 2010). 
We test the interactions between ICT, institutional centralization, and revolutionary 
activity with an agent-based model (ABM). Within our ABM we construct a population of 
autonomous, heterogeneous citizens whose rules-based decisions depend on, and in turn 
influence, the decisions of both their fellow citizens and the authorities that govern their artificial 
world. Agents occupy unique, randomly assigned spaces on a two-dimensional lattice, 
interacting with the members of their directed social network. We execute model simulations 
initializing the model and spinning it forward over discrete time steps. Macroscopic social 
patterns emerge from the interacting decisions made by agents over the course of a simulation 
(Epstein and Axtell 1996; Epstein 2006). We conduct experiments exploring the sources of these 
patterns, running the model tens of thousands of times over a variety of model parameterizations.  
 
The Model 
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The model is a repeated game played over T discrete steps in which M citizens engage in a game 
with a central authority (C) and a non-central authority (N). The central authority moves first, 
then the non-central authority, and finally the citizens. Within the set of citizens, the order of 
activation is randomized at each time step.  The two authorities choose an action that maximizes 
their utility function, based in part on the average citizen action from the previous time step. 
The model is constructed on a 40 by 40 lattice with associated directed network graph.3 
Agent social networks are subsets of selected agents from within their social radius r, which is 
the “Moore Neighborhood” of radius r. The Moore neighborhood is the square of surround cells 
on the lattice. The surveying agent is not included in his own neighborhood.  The lattice is torus 
shaped and wraps at the edges, preventing edge effects. See Figure 1 below.  
 
Figure 1: Citizen social radius on the lattice and network graph.  
 
r = 1(red agents), r = 2 (red, blue), r = 3 (red, blue,green), r = 4 (red, blue, grean, orange) 
The full lattice is 40 by 40 with 1600 agents. 
 
Step (t = 0) Model Initialization. The model creates and places agents randomly, one per lattice 
coordinates (x,y). Agents are heterogeneous across bliss point and are given random values from 
a normal distribution.  All agents are initialized with actions equal to their bliss points. Citizens 
                                                 
3 The model program was written using the MASON simulation Java library (Luke, Cioffi-Revilla et al. 2005).   
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exist on a two-dimensional toroidal lattice. Their social network exists as a directed graph. 
Citizens actively form connections by choosing to connect to the n agents within radius r on the 
lattice whose actions a-i are closest to their own intrinsic bliss point bi. 
Table 1 indicates the order of action. The model analyzes situations in which the 
preferences of some citizens differ exogenously from those of the authorities, so actions could 
represent varying levels of freedom of speech, press, or religion, publicly expressed 
dissatisfaction with the government or religious authorities, or public opinion on social issues. 
Table 1: Order of action (within step) 
1. Central Authority( തܽ௖௜௧௜௭௘௡௦,௧ିଵ) 
2. Non-central Authority(ܽ௖௘௡௧௥௔௟,௧, തܽ௖௜௧௜௭௘௡௦,௧ିଵ) 
3. Citizens(ܽ௖௘௡௧௥௔௟,௧, ܽ௡௢௡௖௘௡௧௥௔௟,௧, തܽ௖௜௧௜௭௘௡௦,௧Ω )† 
† തܽ௖௜௧௜௭௘௡௦,௧Ω is the mean of the most recent actions taken by agents in the acting agent’s social network. It includes a 
mixture of agents whose most recent actions were taken in the current step and agents whose most recent action was 
taken in the previous time step. 
 
Citizens face three costs. Two of these costs are a function of the distance between the 
citizen’s action (aj) and the actions of the two authorities, (aN and aC). These costs are increasing 
in the size of the violation and represent the costs (or punishments) associated with breaking a 
religious dictate, breaking a law, violating a political norm, and the like. 
The third cost is a function of the distance between their action (aj,t) and the average 
action of other citizens within their social network ( തܽ௖௜௧௜௭௘௡௦,௧Ω ). This norm is a property of the 
system that emerges from the interacting decisions of all of the agents.  Each citizen j maximizes 
the following utility function in each period: 
(1) ௝ܷ,௧ ൌ െݓଵ൫ ௝ܽ,௧ െ ௝ܾ൯ଶ െ ݓଶ൫ ௝ܽ,௧ െ തܽ௖௜௧௜௭௘௡௦,௧Ω ൯ଶ െ ݓଷ൫ ௝ܽ,௧ െ ܽ௧ே൯ଶ െ ݓସ൫ ௝ܽ,௧ െ ܽ௧஼൯ଶ, 
where wk is a weighting parameter for k={1,2,3,4}. The utility function is concave, containing 
only a global maximum. This allows us to employ the relatively simple golden mean search 
optimization algorithm (Press 2002) in all agent utility maximization.  
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We define centralization as the weight (γ) that the non-central authority places on 
conforming to the central authority’s dictates. The greater this weight is, the more influence the 
central authority has over the citizenry since they face multiple costs from transgressing the 
central authority. The central and non-central authorities have bliss points bC and bN and 
maximize the following utility functions in each period: 
(2) ௝ܷ,௧஼ ൌ െݓଵ஼ሺܽ௧஼ െ ܾ஼ሻଶ െ ݓଶ஼ሺܽ௧஼ െ തܽ௧ିଵሻଶ 
(3) ௝ܷ,௧ே ൌ െݓଵேሺܽ௧ே െ ܾேሻଶ െ ݓଶேሺܽ௧ே െ തܽ௧ିଵሻଶ െ ߛሺܽ௧ே െ ܽ௧஼ሻଶ 
The fixed parameters employed in the ABM, which are constant across all model 
realizations, are reported in Table 2. 
Table 2: Model parameters 
Parameter Context/Related Function Value 
M # Citizens 1600 
R Social radius {1,2,3,4} 
γ Centralization {0, 0.25,…4} 
S Shock fraction {10%, 20%…100} 
N Social network size 8 
 All other utility function weights 0.5 
tshock Time step for social shock t = 20 
Bliss points Central, Noncentral, mean citizen  {0.0, 0.5, 1.0} 
*The lattice is a 40 by 40 torus with 100% agent density and no overlapping agents. Each combination of 
run parameters was simulated 50 times (n = 42,000) 
 
Citizens first choose their social network and then choose their action. The choice of social 
network involves a survey of all of the citizens, Θi, within their social radius, r, such that ΘiؿM. 
Citizens fill their network using a homophilous selection mechanism (McPherson, Smith-Lovin 
et al. 2001; Macy and Willer 2002; Golub and Jackson 2011), ranking other citizens within their 
neighborhood and forming connections to the n other citizens, ΩiؿΘ, whose most recent actions 
are the closest to their personal bliss point. 
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Agent social networks are governed by two factors: the portion of the lattice over which an agent 
may search for agents to add to her social network and the total number of agents they will 
choose to include in their network. The portion of the lattice they will search is a function of 
their location on the lattice and the network radius parameter, r. In the two dimensional lattice of 
the model, the set Θi , will include 2(2 1) 1r + −  agents. The number of agents chosen in each 
social network, n, is a fixed exogenous parameter in the simulation experiments conducted.  
Step t = 20 
At t = 20, a shock hits a portion of the citizenry. This shock increases the weight that they place 
on their bliss point vis-à-vis the social and institutional costs. The shock represents a change in 
the relative weights associated with acting in favors of one’s internal preferences; whether this 
happens through a rise in one’s weight on their intrinsic preference or a fall in the cost of 
sanctions will yield the same results. In the case of Egypt in 2011, this shock can be interpreted 
as a portion of the population viewing the revolutionary events occurring in Tunisia and deciding 
that fighting the regime is more worthwhile relative to costs than it had been prior to the events 
in Tunisia. 
 
Experiment Results 
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The model was simulated over a range of parameterizations varying the levels of centralization, 
agent network radius,4 and the percentage of the population affected by shock. Each parameter 
combination was simulated 50 times, creating a total sample of 42,000 simulations. 
Preference Falsification 
Prior to the “Arab spring” of 2011, it was extremely costly for most citizens of Egypt, Libya, 
Tunisia, Syria, Bahrain, and a host of other nations to express anti-government preferences. The 
most prominent cost one could face was direct reprisal from the government. Detention without 
trial, partial jurisprudence, and beatings of dissenters were common enough to discourage such 
outward expression. Worse still, it was dangerous to express anti-government opinions even to 
seemingly close relations. In a state where most people publicly expressed favor for the 
government, it was difficult to discern who actually favored the government and who was 
pretending to favor the government. It is clear ex post that preference falsification – defined here 
as the difference between one’s expressed and intrinsic beliefs (Kuran 1987; Kuran 1995) – was 
rampant in the Arab world prior to the 2011 revolts. 
The primary path through which centralization of sanctioning ability affects revolution is 
through preference falsification. In highly centralized societies, citizens are more likely to falsify 
their preferences since the sanctions from expressing anti-government views are greater. This 
means, however, that the expressed preferences are more likely to unravel in a cascade after the 
shock, since the changing of the social norm encourages some to express actions closer to their 
internal preferences, which in turn encourages more to act close to their bliss point, and so on.  
The role that social networking technology played in the Arab revolts has been widely 
reported. Some Western media outlets dubbed these movements the “Twitter revolutions” for the 
role that social networking played in mobilizing and coordinating the protests. Social radius is 
                                                 
4 For an analysis of agent network radius using basic network statistics, see Appendix A.  
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that the preference revelation mechanism which works through networks is not needed to 
transmit the shock and thus social radius matters less. In other words, social media are important 
devices for instigating preference revelation cascades, but only when the shock is not too large or 
too small. Figure 3 also reveals how the effect of centralization on preference falsification is 
affected by the social radius, especially in the “middling shock” ranges. Figure 3 (lower) 
suggests that at the smallest social radius, “middling” shocks do not reach enough of the 
population to affect actions through the changing of norms. Hence, those that do not have the 
shock transmitted to them will not change their actions much in highly centralized regimes, as 
the costs of transgressing the central authority are high. This result again highlights the 
importance of social media in the unraveling of preferences. Without the Internet, Facebook, 
Twitter, or other forms of mass communication outside the hands of the government, it takes a 
really large shock for a cascade to emerge in a centralized regime. Social media dramatically 
reduces the threshold level of the shock needed for a cascade. 
Homophilous selection within populations with greater network range allows agents to 
create personal networks that are more conducive to behavior that deviates from the preferences 
of authorities. The limitations on homophilous selection in small-network societies encourage 
preference falsification, since there is limited spread of citizens’ true preferences throughout the 
population. With larger social radii, however, there is an inverted-U shaped relationship between 
centralization and change in preference falsification. In highly decentralized economies, 
preference falsification unravels little because there was little of it in the first place. Meanwhile, 
preferences in highly centralized economies unravel little because the penalties for transgressing 
the central authority are severe enough that some do not join the cascade even after one has 
emerged. In the middle values of centralization, these two conflicting phenomena do not cancel 
14 
 
each other out and larger cascades emerge. Preference falsification prior to the shock is great 
enough in the middle range where a cascade may occur, but centralization is not so great where 
the downside to joining a cascade discourages preference revelation. 
Preference falsification can lead to a revolution only when a cascade of preference 
revelation occurs. This is more likely to happen when two conditions are met: i) preferences are 
highly falsified prior to the shock, and ii) network radius is large. Hence, cascades should occur 
more frequently in highly centralized societies, ceteris paribus, since preferences are falsified to 
a greater degree. It is possible, however, for an economy to be “too centralized” for a cascade to 
arise. If the sanctions from transgressing the central authority are too severe, too few agents will 
reveal their preferences following the shock and no cascade ensues. 
Protest 
In this section, we analyze the conditions which encourage protest, which we define as the 
difference between the average citizens’ action and the actions of the central authority. In other 
words, our protest measure indicates how far citizens are willing to openly transgress the central 
authority’s dictates. 
Figure 4 shows the average level of protest prior to the shock. Not surprisingly, protest is 
decreasing in centralization and increasing in social radius. One would expect much more anti-
government protest in an unpopular decentralized regime than in an unpopular centralized 
(autocratic) regime. Likewise, one would expect more public protest in high-radius societies than 
in low-radius societies. 
  
Figure 4
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Secondly, in the middling shock range (40%-60%), the difference in protest is decreasing 
in social radius in highly centralized economies (centralization ≥ 3). Despite the fact that low 
network range societies have less absolute protest, the change after the shock is greater in these 
economies. There is very little incentive to protest prior to the shock when networks are weak 
and institutions are highly centralized, so the post-shock protests result in a very different world 
from the one that existed prior to the shock. 
Yet, the larger change in protest does not necessarily lead to a revolution. As we show in 
the next sections, the change in protest is smaller in large-network range economies because both 
the population and the central authority change their actions significantly after the shock. This 
finding is relevant to the events which took place early in the Syria and Bahrain uprisings, where 
some protests occurred (and were eventually beaten back by force) but the governments 
attempted to get ahead of the protests by calling for freer elections and other reforms prior to 
protests escalating to the level of the Egyptian or Libyan revolts. 
Social Revolution 
We are also concerned with how the actions of the citizens change in response to the shock. We 
denote the degree of this change a “social revolution”, since it indicates how publicly expressed 
preferences react to the shock. Figure 7 maps the degree of social revolution over the parameter 
space. There are numerous interesting results that emerge. First, social radius is an important 
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Focusing on the “middling shocks” in Figure 7, it is clear that the relationship between 
centralization and social revolution is not linear and is dependent on social radius. At the 
smallest social radius, social revolution is generally decreasing in centralization. This is not 
surprising; if the shock is not transmitted to the population and the cost of transgressing the 
authority is great, then citizens will change their actions less. This result helps explain why 
highly centralized regimes – not just in the Arab world but in China, Iran, North Korea, and 
Burma, to name a few – attempt to restrict to flow of information at almost any cost. By keeping 
their citizens weakly connected, they greatly reduce the possibility of a social revolution.6 
Conversely, at larger social radii, social revolution has an inverted-U shape with respect 
to centralization. The intuition underlying this result is similar to that espoused in previous 
sections. At extremely high levels of centralization, many citizens choose not to change their 
behavior, even as they observe others in their network doing so. As such, the sanctioning power 
of a heavily centralized authority prevents the actions of an active minority of protestors from 
triggering a cascade and tipping the system. Meanwhile, a cascade may never emerge at lower 
levels of centralization because citizens were falsifying their preferences to a much lesser extent 
prior to the shock, and hence the social revelation mechanism is not necessary. This provides a 
rationale for why revolts in Syria and Bahrain did not succeed in a similar manner to those in 
Tunisia and Egypt. In Syria and Bahrain, the central authority maintained control of the military 
and was willing to use it to suppress revolt, thus increasing the cost of revolt. This was not the 
case in Tunisia or Egypt, where a fractured military did not support the leader in the face of 
                                                 
6 In lower subfigures of Figure 6 through Figure 10, it is notable that the figures are rarely monotonic. This 
complexity in the model is symptomatic of sensitivity to initial conditions. The initial conditions in question are the 
differing arrangement of heterogeneous citizens across the lattice. 
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massive protests (Anderson 2011; Goldstone 2011).7 Employing our definition of centralization, 
this simply means that the governments of Syria and Bahrain were more centralized than those in 
Tunisia and Egypt (where the governments lost control of the military), since the Syrian and 
Bahraini central authorities had control over more types of sanctions. This encouraged more 
social revolt in Syria and Bahrain than it would have if these countries were decentralized (since 
preferences were massively falsified), but less social revolt than in less centralized countries. 
Since the social revolution metric considers actions across time periods, we also analyze 
the change in citizens’ actions relative to their level of protest prior to the shock. These results 
are reported in Figure 8. The level of pre-shock protest is an appropriate weight because it 
measures how “quiet” the streets are prior to the shock. A change in the mean citizens’ action is 
much more revolutionary if it occurs in a society where there is little protest prior to the shock 
relative to a society where citizens are protesting loudly prior to the shock. 
  
                                                 
7 Goldstone (2011) notes that quick and massive changes may occur in centralized regimes when the military is 
fractured, because “the elite and military officers have every reason to hide their true feelings until a crucial moment 
arises, and it is impossible to know which provocation will lead to mass, rather than local, mobilization. The rapid 
unraveling of sultanistic regimes thus often comes as a shock.” 
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preferences are widely expressed, so while a shock may change actions, it rarely leads to a 
preference revelation cascade. 
In centralized economies, however, high-radius is associated with greater social 
revolution. Even though a greater radius does not encourage preference revelation prior to the 
shock (since the associated sanctions are large), the shock facilitates an unraveling of actions to a 
much greater extent and hence social revolution is exacerbated.  
Institutional Revolution 
 While the central authority influences outcomes through its ability to sanction deviant individual 
behavior, it is nonetheless beholden to the choices made by the citizen population.  We denote 
the degree to which the central authority responds to the shock as “institutional revolution.” 
Figure 9 and Figure 10 highlight the degree of institutional revolution over different parts of the 
parameter space, both unweighted (Figure 9Figure 9) and weighted by pre-shock protest (Figure 
10). 
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that affects nearly the entire population. The lower region of Figure 10 suggests that in small-
radius societies, highly centralized authorities (centralization ≥ 3) change their actions much less 
than decentralized authorities. A number of factors lead to this result. For one, the absolute levels 
of protest (Figure 5) and social revolution (Figure 7) are much lower in low radius societies. 
Figure 5 and Figure 7 also indicate that protest and social revolution decline much more steeply 
in low radius societies as centralization increases. Moreover, institutional revolution from 
middling shocks is slightly increasing in centralization in high radius societies (radius = 3 or 4). 
Unlike low-radius societies, which “tip” towards less institutional revolution at sufficiently high 
centralization levels, high-radius societies have slightly more institutional revolution at high 
centralization levels. At first blush, this seems inconsistent with previous results. If preference 
falsification and protest change less in highly centralized societies than in moderately centralized 
societies, (Figure 3 and Figure 6 show an inverted U-shape at large social radii), why is 
institutional revolution increasing in centralization in high-radius societies? 
In such societies, the pre-shock actions of all players favor the central authority to such 
an extent that the authority was in a much better position (relative to a low-centralization 
authority) to cede ground to the citizenry following a cascade of preference revelation. Despite 
the fact that some citizens do not join the cascade in highly centralized economies for fear of 
retribution, the pre-shock action of the central authority is so oppressive vis-à-vis the citizens’ 
bliss points that the central authority has more incentive to relax some of the restrictions 
following a shock that is transmitted to a broad swath of the population. The high radius permits 
the information transmission mechanism to spread the shock, and the central authority responds 
by changing its action to a less oppressive one. This provides an explanation for the actions of 
leaders in Libya, Syria, and Bahrain, where some protests occurred (and were eventually beaten 
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back by force) but the governments attempted to get ahead of the protests by calling for freer 
elections and other reforms prior to protests escalating to the level of the Egyptian or Libyan 
revolts. While the success of the revolts in these countries is still in question, the leaders were 
much more willing to give ground than Tunisian and Egyptian leaders were prior to their ouster. 
In both Figures 9 and 10 we can see two shock fraction thresholds beyond which point 
small and large institutional change can be observed on the part of the central authority. In 
Figure 9 and Figure 10 there are sharp demarcations between blue (zero change), white (mild 
change), and red (significant change) regions of the heat map.  These demarcations reveal 
thresholds – the minimum shock size necessary to trigger a cascade causing institutional change. 
These minimum shock thresholds are decreasing with social radius. This effect can be observed 
more clearly in Figure 11. The amount of institutional revolution is monotonically increasing 
with shock size, but in a discontinuous manner. The threshold values which trigger large 
amounts of social change are both proceeded and followed by extended plateaus over which 
great shock size does not result any (significant) additional institutional change. The shock 
fraction thresholds at which these sharp increases in institutional change occur are decreasing as 
network radii increases.  
 
Figure 11: Average unweighted institutional revolution (Central action40 – Central action20) over 
shock fraction (Centralization (γ) =3.0) 
 
Shock Fraction  
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Figure 11 indicates that the stability of centralized institutions is decreasing with social 
radius. It also reveals the threshold below which social shocks can go completely unnoticed, 
having no visible effect on the behavior of the central authority. In Figure 11, when social 
networks have a radius of 1, the authority will not change at all until a social shock reaches 50% 
of the population. If the network radius increases to 2, however, much smaller shocks can tip the 
system towards significant institutional change. This result offers the theoretical possibility that 
recent revolutionary phenomena, such as the Arab Spring, are not the product of unusually 
pervasive social shocks, but rather authorities that are now vulnerable to much smaller shocks 
(shocks that would have previously gone unnoticed) because of the increased availability of 
modern social networking technology.   
 
Conclusion 
Our results suggest that highly centralized regimes may seem tranquil but are highly susceptible 
to revolution, especially in large network-range economies. This sheds light on the institutional, 
technological, and social mechanisms facilitating the recent spread of revolutionary activity in 
the Arab world, highlighting the reasons underlying differing institutional responses to public 
discontent in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, and Bahrain. An agent-based model highlights the 
role that information and communication technology play in triggering cascades of preference 
revelation in centralized societies. We show that network range reduces the minimum shock that 
is sufficient to effect institutional change, though this result is contingent upon the degree to 
which institutions are centralized. We find that revolutions are more likely to occur as societies 
become more centralized when network range is large but less likely to occur in centralized 
societies when network range is small. While the citizen population reacts to exogenous social 
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shocks in a steady, linear manner, central authorities exhibit a far more punctuated behavioral 
pattern, changing their behavior only when an exogenous shock is sufficiently large to the tip the 
system towards significant change. The thresholds at which central authorities change their 
behavior are significantly reduced by increased social network reach. These results point towards 
a world where heavily centralized authorities are more likely to move towards the preferences of 
the general population in societies with increased access to modern ICT. At the same time, these 
results also reveal the incentive for central authorities to limit citizen access to ICT, including the 
internet and social networking.   
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Appendix 
Distributions of Preferences and Actions 
Figure 12 and Figure13 present the distributions of bliss points and actions at time steps 20 and 
40 from single runs of the model under different parameterizations. Both sets of distributions are 
from runs of the model with shocks covering 20% and 80% of the population, with 
centralizations parameters (γ) of 1.0 and 3.0. Figure 12 includes runs with agent social radius of 
1 andFigure 13 Figure 13 includes runs with a social radius of 4.  
 
Figure 12: The distributions of agent bliss points (red), actions at t = 20 (blue) and t = 40 
(yellow) at social radius = 1 
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Figure 13: The distributions of agent bliss points (red), actions at t = 20 (blue) and t = 40 
(yellow) at social radius = 4 
 
 
Alternative experimental construct 
As a robustness check, we ran the model experiments using an alternative network exploratory 
scheme. Instead of increasing the radius of the of Moore neighborhood of agent networks across 
runs of the model, we created “mixed radius models” where a percentage of the population has 
“large radius” networks (r = 4) and the rest have “small radius” networks (r = 1). Varying the 
percentage of “large radius” across runs, we generated qualitatively identical results to models 
varying the network range of the entire population. Figure 14 presents the results for institutional 
revolution using the alternative network experiment structure.  
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Figure 14: Institutional revolution using alternative network 
 
 
As can be seen in Figure 14, the qualitative structure of the results is nearly identical to 
our original experimental structure. For the nature of investigation, increasing the percentage of 
the population with long range social networks is largely equivalent to incrementally increasing 
the radius of the entire population.  
 
Statistical Analysis of Network Radius 
The changing ICT landscape is captured in the model with the social network radius parameter. 
The character of these changing social networks is further explored using rudimentary network 
statistical analysis. We make use of three measures: node connectivity, mean geodesic, and local 
clustering coefficient. The node connectivity of a graph is the minimum number of nodes that 
must be removed make it disconnected (i.e., leaving at least one agent stranded without a 
connection to any other agent). The mean geodesic is the average shortest path between any pair 
of nodes in the network. The local clustering coefficient measures the average ratio of 
connections to a node to number of possible connections. As agent neighborhoods move towards 
becoming complete (fully-connected) graphs, the local clustering coefficient increases. For 
further discussion of these network statistics, see Wasserman and Faust (1994). 
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In Figure 15, we chart the network statistics before and after the shock from an 
experiment over the different social network radii.  All of the runs include a shock affecting 50% 
of the agent population and centralization (γ) = 2.  The experiment was run 10 times with each 
network radius setting (n = 40). Connectivity (both before and after the shock) is increasing with 
network radius.  At the same time, the mean geodesic is decreasing with network radius, as 
measured both before and after the shock. Clustering before the shock is steadily increasing with 
network radius. Clustering after the shock, however, has a less linear relationship with network 
radius, making a considerable jump from R = 2 to R = 3, but the two are nonetheless positively 
correlated.  The connectedness of agents, both globally (in terms of both node connectivity and 
mean geodesic) and locally (clustering), is increasing with network radius, and in turn supports 
the cascades of social change observed in the model. 
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Figure 15: Network clustering coefficient, connectivity, and mean geodesic over network radius, 
t=20 and t=40 
 
